

## Introduction

- Default effect, namely that making an option as a default increases its possibility to be selected.
- Framing indicates the different presentation (positive/negative) of a logical equivalent outcome to decision-makers. Irwin Levin claims that framing can also be based on risk, attribute, or goals. This paper focus on (positive and negative) goal framing.
- Goal framing "could be the most applicable to a fundraising context because it is geared towards persuasion" (Smyth & Macquillin, 2018).
- Prior studies show that higher defaults and negative framing can better elicit donations than lower defaults or positive framing.
- Since past research mainly focuses on investing defaults and framing on college students or adults in western society, there is a research gap in the effectiveness of teenagers in eastern society (the different public service culture may affect the individuals' decision-making)
- Thus, this paper examines the impact of default donation options and the framing of charitable solicitations on Chinese teenagers' online donation decisions.

## Hypotheses

- H1:** Teenagers' donation rate will be higher when the default option is lower.
- H2:** A higher default option will be more effective than a low default option when promoting teenagers' average amount of donation.
- H3:** Teenagers' donation rate will be higher when the solicitation framing is negative.
- H4:** A negatively framed message will be more effective than a comparable positively framed message when promoting teenagers' contribution levels.
- H5:** There would be no effect of interaction between defaults and framing on teenagers' donation decisions.

## Method

An experiment of 2x2, goal framing (positive vs negative) x default option (high vs low), was developed to examine which of the separate effect and interaction of message framing and default options when promoting teenagers' online donation behaviors.

### Experimental Design and Manipulations

The author combines a default manipulation (high defaults versus low defaults) with a framing setting manipulation (positive versus negative).

#### 1) Default options

- High-default option: 90RMB
- Low-default option: 18RMB

**Participants: 195 individuals participated in the survey. Due to incomplete responses and age below or exceed the prescribed age (12-19), the number of usable questionnaires was to 167. There were 85 males and 82 females; 64.07% respondents of them have had previous online donating experiences.**

#### 2) Framing

- Positive framing: "Donating long-lasting anti-malaria nets can effectively prevent malaria. According to the Against Malaria Foundation, with every 500 additional nets put into use, one more child's life can be saved from malaria."
- Negative framing: "Donating long-lasting anti-malaria nets can effectively prevent malaria. According to the Against Malaria Foundation, when the number of mosquito nets donated and put into use drops by 500, one more child will lose his life due to malaria."


## Results

### The Effect of Defaults on Donation Rate

	Donation Rate	N
Low	0.8902	82
High	0.8353	85
Total	0.8628	167

### The Effect of Defaults on Average Donation Amount

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Low	16.524	12.1597	82
High	58.353	38.0506	85
Total	39.747	35.2802	167



### The Effect of Framing on Donation Rate

	Donation Rate	N
Positive	0.8250	87
Negative	0.9195	80
Total	0.87225	167

### The Effect of Framing on Average Donation Amount

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Positive	39.747	35.9981	87
Negative	35.713	34.5855	80
Total	37.814	35.2802	167

	Framing	Default
Questionnaire1	Positive	Low
Questionnaire2	Negative	Low
Questionnaire3	Positive	High
Questionnaire4	Negative	High

## Discussion

- In this study, the author found that default donation options can affect teenagers' donation decisions. The participants showed a higher donation rate when the defaults were relatively low and showed a higher average donation amount when the defaults were high.
- Additionally, the result shows that the framing of solicitations did not affect teenagers' donation decisions because the donation rate and the amount of donation did not differ.
- Finally, there was no interaction effect between the defaults and framing, which means that the existence of one effect did not affect the other.
- The results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that default options for charitable donation may elicit teenagers' donation intention in surveys. Apart from its theoretical significance, the results show deep implications for how charities such as NGOs, student clubs, public service/non-profit projects can motivate donations through the application of default effects.

## Limitations & Future Research

- The findings are based on a single hypothetical research exposure to one of four online donation questionnaires, which do not have real-world consequences for respondents. Thus, the author encourage more future studies with actual donation decisions. It is possible that different results might be obtained if participants are facing real donation scenarios.
- Broader and more diverse samples of teenagers should be examined in additional research. The convenience sample that is collected through the author's social networking tends to produce biases. Also, all the participants are Chinese teenagers who live in developed urban areas. Therefore, one proposition for additional study is to collect larger and more diverse samples and avoid convenience samples.
- A worthwhile issue for additional research is to explore the effect of defaults and framing with vividness presentations, since in charitable contexts, such as crowd-funding platforms, vivid presentations are usually examined through case stories and images of recipients.

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